Hi Lloyd,

I've been taking a vacation from the deeper aspects of our world as I sometimes do. It might take me a little bit to get my mind back in synch with such conversations. I've often made mention that even though my mind is very inclined to thinking in absolute terms and such, it would seem that the default state of most minds is to just wrap itself within the fabric of existence rather than to examine how such fabric is woven together. My mind is subject to this very thing as any break from such conversations often finds my attention drifting back to the day to day grind of merely making a living rather than questioning life.

Anyways, as you well know, my views on the mechanics of the universe are just that, strictly mechanical. So, determinism and randomness are reduced to more of an accuracy of cause and effect at the micro resolution. When we make ever further reductions from the macro inward towards the fabric of the micro and then search for the fundamental aspects from which all other phenomena flourish, we then find that for the most part, most phenomena can be encompassed within an overall mechanical system operating within certain parameters from which the very laws of physics emerge. At this point we must distinguish between the determinism and uncertainty of the observer peering inward vs that of the universe merely operating locally and nonlocally with and amongst itself. Is there a degree of uncertainty and chance relative to our perspective as the observer? Of course, and there always will be because the very fundamental processes which compound to form our composite instruments, bodies and thoughts are operating at scales and intervals far removed from the fundamental resolution at which such an argument must ultimately arrive at to find truth one way or the other. Is there a degree of uncertainty and chance within the fundamental interactions and mechanics? Well, this is more of a philosophical question not in the sense that it doesn't fall under the aspects or hand of science, but in the sense that it doesn't fall under the reach of science. I can imagine and perhaps logically infer a high degree of precision amongst interactions at such scales but admit that knowing just how much is impossible and perhaps irrelevant. It is from these scales that all further scales and resolutions emerge, thus such micro interactions are the very definitions of deterministic precision along with any degree of chance. Even with such concepts as elastic collisions and such many of our further concepts of angles, degrees, etc, perhaps have no meaning at such scales just yet, but become apparent as composite parameters of the more macro realms. Perhaps there is minor or major variances in interactions at such scales, which are so small they become meaningless over the great time and distances it takes for information to be processed at even the shortest distances and time intervals which we can observe. There's also the possibility of the eternal aspect of the interactions taking place, whereby the overlapping of cause and effect, even at a high degree of deterministic precision within spatial coordinates is null and void due to the temporal aspect of eternal process resonating throughout, whereby a reverberation of some aspect never has a precise moment of cause, thus there is no distinction between determinism and chance.

I don't think such aspects can be approached philosophically head on with science as with trying to resolve this by way of coin tosses or further investigations. If there is a resolution to such, I would presume it to come by way of questioning the very mechanics by which we think, and explore the perhaps impossibility of our thoughts and logic to reveal to us that we are within a deterministic system if they too be an algorithm of such. I don't know that such concepts gets us any closer to a self satisfying answer, but I see no possibility of a head on physical approach to such conversations any longer. At best, I see no way of declaring a truly absolute deterministic system other than implying a high degree of such being geo required. Perhaps all that is left is a logical philosophical argument upon the inability for a brain operating within such parameters to resolve past a certain resolution, whereby only proving that even if within such a deterministic system, we will never know either way. This in itself is an answer, even if seemingly not being the one we search for and discuss. Perhaps the final frontier of science is playing the mind against the the very universe which constructed it through the eons of time and infinite expanses of space whereby reaching philosophical ground which we before have been unable to explore. There is much to be considered when exploring the aspects of the objective classic mechanical observer independent universe contrasted with the more subjective observer dependent aspects of RM and QM. The point at which the fabric is woven to peer back into its own design and texture whereby the universe reaches a local state of evolved interactions to produce life, thought, imagination, etc, is the very essence of how fundamental simplicity which still exists at the most micro of scales is masked by the macro complexity of mere scale and resolution of such interactions taking place through eons and infinities. Such a high order arrangement as the body and brain may have only been around for a universal second, but we have the entire age and expanse of the universe behind our emergence here. It's obviously taken the right circumstances to be met along with the systems building the systems which build the systems e.g. atoms, galaxies, stars, planets, DNA, etc, for us to awaken into this world in which we now look back within and upon and question from where we came.

later,

Tim

Chance, Design, and Cause...

http://www.stephenwolfram.com/publications/recent/fqxi09/
http://www.wolframscience.com/nksonline/toc.html
http://www.wolframalpha.com/
http://blog.wolfram.com/2011/03/30/launching-a-new-era-in-large-scale-systems-modeling/#more-5437

Hi Tim, I continue to post ideas that back up my position of necessary free-will, against your position of necessary determinism, and this post is just the official original document of which I always backed my position by. Notice though, Peirce's position is as mine has also always been__though free-will be necessary, determinism is also necessary in my positions__Both be required... I think this article explains it best, by way of what a Universal Law of Physics Limits truly are__and how this plays such an important part, due to statistical mechanics being required to mathematically figure the Universe's fundamental chance actions, as per the gas models figured back in the 19th century, by Gibbs' and Boltzmann's statistical mechanical systems__which must be understood to operate in opposing fashion/function to probability mechanics... When all this is throughly understood__one comes to not only the realization of chance and free-will existing, but being a necessary mechanics of quantum and Universal mechanics, along with its larger constituent of deterministic mechanics__but it's all founded in the micro states of chance mechanics__which allows personality and free-wills to self-controllingly process all its personal informations__which can be great, i.e., in the millions or even billions of inferences and ideas, into the choice of the ones we follow__and this in turn is the evolutional traditional, legal and habitual history of humanity's advance, since the beginning... We all look to the world FIRST, to see where we want to go, and personally choose our own paths through life__That's free-will, grounded in "The World of Chance Speaks FIRST..."

I just think it's funny that 'Scientific Modernism' was pointed out to the entire world, over 100 years ago__and it didn't listen. Peirce has now been accorded the title of 'The 21st century's number one philosopher'__though he was actually the world's greatest scientist and logician__ever to live... That newest book I referenced and linked to by T.L. Short before, proves it__Hands down... http://heavysideindustries.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Peirce-TheoryofSigns.pdf

Tim, imo, Peirce was and is the greatest logician and quantum mechanicist to ever live, and Short also explains Peirce's ideas in relation to modern quantum mechanics__as I have in many places... Imo, the mind must absolutely be fully understood, to understand the full workings of QM... CM and RM, we can simply understand, but not QM, which involves the self-understanding being involved in the very mechanics under investigation__and that requires the 'deepest logic and mechanics' we can achieve__'QMM', or 'Quantum Mental Mechanics...'

And now, on to Peirce's article: Chance, Design, and Cause...

WE are now in a position to distinguish the principal senses in which we commonly speak of the operations of chance.

(1) A chance event, as we have seen, may be a member of a series which exemplifies a game of chance. What is required of such a series is that it should conform to the a priori calculus of chances. If we take the simple example of a series of tosses with a coin, this would imply that in a reasonably long run there should be an approximate equality of heads and tails. It is, however, doubtful if this condition is sufficient. For instance, it would be satisfied by a series of tosses in which heads and tails regularly alternated: yet a series of this kind would not normally be regarded as typifying chance. What seems also to be required is that the series should satisfy a condition of randomness. I do not think that this condition need be so strong as the principle of indifference to place selection which has been adopted by some modern proponents of the frequency theory of probability. It might be enough that every possible sequence of some arbitrarily determined length should occur with approximately equal frequency.

To speak of a chance event, in this sense, is not to imply that the event is not caused, or even that it is not designed. The results of particular tosses of a coin, or throws of a die, or spins of a roulette wheel, are commonly not designed, but it is very often due to design that the series in which they occur conforms as a whole to the a priori calculus.

It is in accordance with this usage that when events of a certain kind occur with a frequency which deviates significantly from the a priori probabilities, they are said not to occur by chance. I have, however, tried to show that such a deviation does not, in itself, call for any special explanation. It is only when we have empirical evidence that the events are of a kind to which the a priori calculus normally does apply that their discrepancy becomes significant.

(2) Just as we look for a cause when we come upon an 'improbable' deviation in a series of a type which normally conforms to the calculus of chances, so conversely there are cases in which a deviation from an established law-like pattern is put down to chance. It is in this sense, for example, that biologists speak of chance mutations. What is implied here is not necessarily that the event in question is not susceptible of any causal explanation. It is enough that its occurrence should not be predictable in terms of the scientific theory with which we are operating. So, in our example, the theory of evolution provides for the occurrences of mutations only in a general way: it does not enable us to predict when and in what form they will occur. One could say that the theory made provision for them as chance events.

Examples of this usage occur also in historical discourse. 'For want of a nail the shoe was lost, for want of a shoe the horse was lost, for want of the horse the rider was lost, for want of the rider the battle was lost, for want of the battle the kingdom was lost, and all for the want of a horse shoe nail.' We say that the kingdom was lost by mischance, not for lack of a causal explanation but because its being lost in this manner is not something that any historical theory could have enabled us to foresee. It is not part of any recognized historical pattern that so trivial an event as a nail's falling out of a horse's shoe should have such far-reaching consequences.

(3) A third sense of chance is that in which it is contrasted with design. It applies to events which are brought about by human beings, or by other animals in so far as they can be said to have intentions. To attribute an event to chance, in this sense, is just to say that it was not intended by the agent in question. Here again, it is not implied that the event lacked a cause.

(4) We speak of a chance collocation of events when their concurrence is not designed and when, though we may be able to account for them severally, we have not established any law-like proposition which links them together. The ascription of such concurrences to chance is most often made in cases where something of especial interest to us follows from them, or in cases where the concurrence would normally be the result of design. Thus, if in the course of a journey I keep running into friends whom I had not arranged to meet, I am struck by the coincidence, though in fact it is no more of a coincidence than my meeting anybody else. This is on the assumption that the frequency of these encounters does not greatly exceed the average: otherwise, as we have seen, I am justified in suspecting design. If design is ruled out, our speaking of coincidence implies no more than that the events in question are not connected by any law-like generalization which figures in our accepted system of beliefs. It does not commit us to holding that no law which would connect them could ever be discovered.

(5) In one of the senses in which 'chance' is a synonym for 'probability', the chance that an event of such and such a sort will have a given character is equated with the frequency with which the character is actually distributed throughout the class of events in question. There are different ways in which these frequencies may be estimated: they may be extrapolated from recorded statistics, or they may be deduced from a scientific theory. In cases where they are deduced from a theory, it may or may not be assumed that the statistical laws which figure in the theory are derivable, at least in principle, from underlying causal laws. Thus the assumption in classical physics was that everything depended on the state of individual particles the behaviour of which was rigorously governed by Newtonian laws. If, as in the kinetic theory of gases, one was content to rely upon statistical laws, it was because of the practical difficulty of tracing the movements of the individual particles. On the other hand, in contemporary quantum physics, the laws are fundamentally statistical; the individual particles are not represented as obeying causal laws: the states of the system are statistically defined. This does not exclude the possibility, in which some physicists believe, of finding a deterministic theory which would account for the same phenomena: but it would have to be a radically different sort of theory. (6) Let us suppose that no such theory is forthcoming. It can then be said that these are chance events, in a stronger sense of the term than any that we have yet considered. A chance event, in this sense, would be one that was not subject to any causal law. If we are going to maintain that there are chance events of this kind, we must, however, be careful to formulate our position in a way that prevents it from being trivially refutable. The difficulty is that if we set no limit to the form of our hypotheses, then so long as we are dealing with a closed set of events, we shall always be able to find some generalizations which they satisfy. We, therefore, need to place some restriction on what is to count as a causal law. Perhaps the best course would be to stipulate that for a generalization to be a causal law it was necessary that it should apply to events which were not included in the set which it was already known to cover. In other words, one mark of a causal law would be that it was actually used to make successful extrapolations. To deny that phenomena of a given type were subject to causal laws would then have the force of predicting that however far our researches are pressed we shall never succeed in bringing them under 'workable' generalizations of a causal sort.

(7) Following C. S. Peirce,1 I think that there is another way in which the course of nature may be held to exhibit an irreducible factor of chance. Even in a domain in which causal laws are well established, there is often a certain looseness in their grasp upon the observed facts. The phenomena which are taken as verifying them cover a certain range: if they are quantitative, the values which are actually recorded may be scattered around the values which the laws prescribe. These slight deviations are not held to be significant: they are put down to errors of observation. But 'errors of observation' is here a term of art. Apart from the existence of the deviation, there is usually no reason to suppose that any error has occurred. Now it seems possible that this looseness of fit cannot be wholly eliminated or, in other words, that there are limits to the precision with which observable events can be forecast. If this were so, it might be said that anything which fell outside these limits remained in the hands of chance.

Admittedly, this cannot be demonstrated. Whatever limits are set, there can be no a priori reason for assuming that they will never be overstepped. The person who believes in chance, in any such absolute sense, can properly do no more than issue a challenge. He points to certain features of the world and defies anyone to show that they fall entirely, in every detail, within the grasp of causal laws. In the sense in which to speak of chance is to express what I have called a judgement of credibility, I think that there is a good chance that someone who takes this position will be able to maintain it. There is, however, a sense in which it can be said of anything not known to be logically or causally impossible that there is a chance that it will happen: and in this sense, however long the champion of absolute chance has remained in possession of the field, there must always remain the chance that his challenge will eventually be met.

System's-Modeling Link

P.s.
The first link, at the head of this article: 'What Is Ultimately Possible in Physics?"
is an excellent post, thoroughly in line with my positions__and by one of America's premier mathematicians/logicians/physicists...

Chance, Design, and Cause...

Hi Tim, I continue to post ideas that back up my position of necessary free-will, against your position of necessary determinism, and this post is just the official original document of which I always backed my position by. Notice though, Peirce's position is as mine has also always been__though free-will be necessary, determinism is also necessary in my positions__Both be required... I think this article explains it best, by way of what a Universal Law of Physics Limits truly are__and how this plays such an important part, due to statistical mechanics being required to mathematically figure the Universe's fundamental chance actions, as per the gas models figured back in the 19th century, by Gibbs' and Boltzmann's statistical mechanical systems__which must be understood to operate in opposing fashion/function to probability mechanics... When all this is throughly understood__one comes to not only the realization of chance and free-will existing, but being a necessary mechanics of quantum and Universal mechanics, along with its larger constituent of deterministic mechanics__but it's all founded in the micro states of chance mechanics__which allows personality and free-wills to self-controllingly process all its personal informations__which can be great, i.e., in the millions or even billions of inferences and ideas, into the choice of the ones we follow__and this in turn is the evolutional traditional and habitual history of humanity's advance, since the beginning... We all look to the world FIRST, to see where we want to go, and personally choose our own paths through life__That's free-will, grounded in "The World of Chance Speaks FIRST..."

I just think it's funny that 'Scientific Modernism' was pointed out to the entire world, over 100 years ago__and it didn't listen. Peirce has now been accorded the title of 'The 21st century's number one philosopher'__though he was actually the world's greatest scientist and logician__ever to live... That newest book I referenced and linked to by T.L. Short before, proves it__Hands down... http://heavysideindustries.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Peirce-TheoryofSigns.pdf

Tim, imo, Peirce was and is the greatest logician and quantum mechanicist to ever live, and Short also explains Peirce's ideas in relation to modern quantum mechanics__as I have in many places... Imo, the mind must absolutely be fully understood, to understand the full workings of QM... CM and RM, we can simply understand, but not QM, which involves the self-understanding being involved in the very mechanics under investigation__and that requires the 'deepest logic and mechanics' we can achieve__'QMM', or 'Quantum Mental Mechanics...'

And now, on to Peirce's article: Chance, Design, and Cause...

WE are now in a position to distinguish the principal senses in which we commonly speak of the operations of chance.

(1) A chance event, as we have seen, may be a member of a series which exemplifies a game of chance. What is required of such a series is that it should conform to the a priori calculus of chances. If we take the simple example of a series of tosses with a coin, this would imply that in a reasonably long run there should be an approximate equality of heads and tails. It is, however, doubtful if this condition is sufficient. For instance, it would be satisfied by a series of tosses in which heads and tails regularly alternated: yet a series of this kind would not normally be regarded as typifying chance. What seems also to be required is that the series should satisfy a condition of randomness. I do not think that this condition need be so strong as the principle of indifference to place selection which has been adopted by some modern proponents of the frequency theory of probability. It might be enough that every possible sequence of some arbitrarily determined length should occur with approximately equal frequency.

To speak of a chance event, in this sense, is not to imply that the event is not caused, or even that it is not designed. The results of particular tosses of a coin, or throws of a die, or spins of a roulette wheel, are commonly not designed, but it is very often due to design that the series in which they occur conforms as a whole to the a priori calculus.

It is in accordance with this usage that when events of a certain kind occur with a frequency which deviates significantly from the a priori probabilities, they are said not to occur by chance. I have, however, tried to show that such a deviation does not, in itself, call for any special explanation. It is only when we have empirical evidence that the events are of a kind to which the a priori calculus normally does apply that their discrepancy becomes significant.

(2) Just as we look for a cause when we come upon an 'improbable' deviation in a series of a type which normally conforms to the calculus of chances, so conversely there are cases in which a deviation from an established law-like pattern is put down to chance. It is in this sense, for example, that biologists speak of chance mutations. What is implied here is not necessarily that the event in question is not susceptible of any causal explanation. It is enough that its occurrence should not be predictable in terms of the scientific theory with which we are operating. So, in our example, the theory of evolution provides for the occurrences of mutations only in a general way: it does not enable us to predict when and in what form they will occur. One could say that the theory made provision for them as chance events.

Examples of this usage occur also in historical discourse. 'For want of a nail the shoe was lost, for want of a shoe the horse was lost, for want of the horse the rider was lost, for want of the rider the battle was lost, for want of the battle the kingdom was lost, and all for the want of a horse shoe nail.' We say that the kingdom was lost by mischance, not for lack of a causal explanation but because its being lost in this manner is not something that any historical theory could have enabled us to foresee. It is not part of any recognized historical pattern that so trivial an event as a nail's falling out of a horse's shoe should have such far-reaching consequences.

(3) A third sense of chance is that in which it is contrasted with design. It applies to events which are brought about by human beings, or by other animals in so far as they can be said to have intentions. To attribute an event to chance, in this sense, is just to say that it was not intended by the agent in question. Here again, it is not implied that the event lacked a cause.

(4) We speak of a chance collocation of events when their concurrence is not designed and when, though we may be able to account for them severally, we have not established any law-like proposition which links them together. The ascription of such concurrences to chance is most often made in cases where something of especial interest to us follows from them, or in cases where the concurrence would normally be the result of design. Thus, if in the course of a journey I keep running into friends whom I had not arranged to meet, I am struck by the coincidence, though in fact it is no more of a coincidence than my meeting anybody else. This is on the assumption that the frequency of these encounters does not greatly exceed the average: otherwise, as we have seen, I am justified in suspecting design. If design is ruled out, our speaking of coincidence implies no more than that the events in question are not connected by any law-like generalization which figures in our accepted system of beliefs. It does not commit us to holding that no law which would connect them could ever be discovered.

(5) In one of the senses in which 'chance' is a synonym for 'probability', the chance that an event of such and such a sort will have a given character is equated with the frequency with which the character is actually distributed throughout the class of events in question. There are different ways in which these frequencies may be estimated: they may be extrapolated from recorded statistics, or they may be deduced from a scientific theory. In cases where they are deduced from a theory, it may or may not be assumed that the statistical laws which figure in the theory are derivable, at least in principle, from underlying causal laws. Thus the assumption in classical physics was that everything depended on the state of individual particles the behaviour of which was rigorously governed by Newtonian laws. If, as in the kinetic theory of gases, one was content to rely upon statistical laws, it was because of the practical difficulty of tracing the movements of the individual particles. On the other hand, in contemporary quantum physics, the laws are fundamentally statistical; the individual particles are not represented as obeying causal laws: the states of the system are statistically defined. This does not exclude the possibility, in which some physicists believe, of finding a deterministic theory which would account for the same phenomena: but it would have to be a radically different sort of theory. (6) Let us suppose that no such theory is forthcoming. It can then be said that these are chance events, in a stronger sense of the term than any that we have yet considered. A chance event, in this sense, would be one that was not subject to any causal law. If we are going to maintain that there are chance events of this kind, we must, however, be careful to formulate our position in a way that prevents it from being trivially refutable. The difficulty is that if we set no limit to the form of our hypotheses, then so long as we are dealing with a closed set of events, we shall always be able to find some generalizations which they satisfy. We, therefore, need to place some restriction on what is to count as a causal law. Perhaps the best course would be to stipulate that for a generalization to be a causal law it was necessary that it should apply to events which were not included in the set which it was already known to cover. In other words, one mark of a causal law would be that it was actually used to make successful extrapolations. To deny that phenomena of a given type were subject to causal laws would then have the force of predicting that however far our researches are pressed we shall never succeed in bringing them under 'workable' generalizations of a causal sort.

(7) Following C. S. Peirce,1 I think that there is another way in which the course of nature may be held to exhibit an irreducible factor of chance. Even in a domain in which causal laws are well established, there is often a certain looseness in their grasp upon the observed facts. The phenomena which are taken as verifying them cover a certain range: if they are quantitative, the values which are actually recorded may be scattered around the values which the laws prescribe. These slight deviations are not held to be significant: they are put down to errors of observation. But 'errors of observation' is here a term of art. Apart from the existence of the deviation, there is usually no reason to suppose that any error has occurred. Now it seems possible that this looseness of fit cannot be wholly eliminated or, in other words, that there are limits to the precision with which observable events can be forecast. If this were so, it might be said that anything which fell outside these limits remained in the hands of chance.

Admittedly, this cannot be demonstrated. Whatever limits are set, there can be no a priori reason for assuming that they will never be overstepped. The person who believes in chance, in any such absolute sense, can properly do no more than issue a challenge. He points to certain features of the world and defies anyone to show that they fall entirely, in every detail, within the grasp of causal laws. In the sense in which to speak of chance is to express what I have called a judgement of credibility, I think that there is a good chance that someone who takes this position will be able to maintain it. There is, however, a sense in which it can be said of anything not known to be logically or causally impossible that there is a chance that it will happen: and in this sense, however long the champion of absolute chance has remained in possession of the field, there must always remain the chance that his challenge will eventually be met.

The Mysterious Case of the Surplus Body...

(Tim, this is a new discovery in statistical mechanics and probability mechanics, which stipulates the problems between mechanical and mechanistic causation, uncovering the teleology thesis, reality existence__and is the reason I’ve posted it in its entirety. Of course to most likely understand it thoroughly, you’d need much more background history__but Short’s book about Peirce offers much: http://heavysideindustries.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Peirce-TheoryofSigns.pdf …)

I refer, of course, to bodies of explanation. There are two such bodies
named ‘statistical’ (sometimes ‘probabilistic’), differing fundamentally
in their structure, where the name suggests that there is only one. The
extra body is therefore rarely noticed.

The leading accounts that philosophers, including Peirce, have given
of statistical explanation all agree, amazingly, in ignoring the special
character of explanation in statistical mechanics (Railton, vide infra,
excepted).17 Contemporary discussions of this topic begin with the ‘covering
law’ model due to Hempel (1962), and it is convenient for us to
begin there, too.

According to Hempel, statistical explanation is an inference, of a statement
of the phenomenon to be explained, from premisses that include
a statement of at least one probabilistic law. Such a law, in the simplest
case, is of the form P(E /C ) = p, where p is a real number, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, and
P(E /C ) is the probability of E conditional on C obtaining. Thus, from a
premiss that C and a premiss that P(E /C ) = p, we can infer that E, the
inference having a probability p of being correct, relative to the information
supplied in the premisses.

Others deny that explanation is inference, and deal far differently
from Hempel with the problem of the reference class (i.e., how C is to

17 The literature on statistical explanation should not be confused with the much larger and more sophisticated literature on statistical inference. Although the former sometimes draws on the latter, the latter is not concerned with what constitutes explanation; it is concerned with the meaning of probability and the different kinds of inference that different theories of probability justify. Those issues are central to foundational debates in statistical mechanics, but relatively little of the literature on statistical inference deals with statistical mechanics, von Mises (1957 [1928]) and Jeffreys (1973 [1931]) being major exceptions.

be chosen) and the question of how, if at all, assessing the probability
of an outcome either contributes to or is implicated in its explanation.
Richard Jeffrey (1970) pointed out that assigning an explanandum a
high probability does not always explain it and, more surprisingly, that
some good explanations accord the explanandum a low probability. If
things of a certain kind happen by chance (e.g., the decay of an atom of a
radioactive element in a given period of time), then that is how a thing of
that kind happens, even if its chance was low. But all agree that statistical
explanations presuppose probabilistic laws of the sort described – laws
that enable us to derive a probability for a given outcome from known
conditions.

And that fails utterly to capture the reasoning in statistical mechanics,
in which the laws assumed may be deterministic, not probabilistic,
and in which the initial conditions are unknown. A typical example is the
explanation of the evolution of an enclosed system of gas molecules from
being less equally to being more equally distributed. There are trillions of
molecules in even a cubic centimeter of gas, and any observable distribution
of them (a macrostate) would be constituted by any of an enormous
number of alternative arrangements (microstates) of the molecules. We
must therefore remain ignorant of the actual arrangements, including
the initial arrangement. Statistical reasoning shows nonetheless that the
chances overwhelmingly favor changes from less to more equal distribution,
until near-equality is reached. Rather than deriving a probability
from known conditions, the movement of thought in statistical mechanics
is almost the polar opposite: from ignorance of initial conditions (at the
microlevel) to virtual certainty about the outcome (at the macrolevel).18

How is it possible that this obvious point has been overlooked or,
at least, neglected? The explanation, in part, is that the formalism
P(E /C ) = p does not distinguish between the two kinds of case. Thus,
Hempel cited a range of examples, from radioactive decay to rolling
dice, without distinguishing probabilistic dependence of an outcome on
known conditions (radioactive decay) from ignorance of conditions possibly
deterministic (rolling dice) (1962, pp. 121–2).

Perhaps the best-known alternatives to Hempel’s model are two due to
the lateWesley Salmon. In his ‘statistical relevance’ model, a fact explains
an event if, putting it perhaps too simply, it accords it a probability that
would be unaltered by any further fact other than that of the event
itself (1970). Salmon is quite clear that such assessments of probability

18 See chapter 5, section 1, for a more detailed discussion of this example.

presuppose probabilistic laws (1970). No distinction is made between different
forms of statistical explanation.19 Salmon’s later, ‘causal/ mechanical’
model retains the idea of statistical relevance but adds to it the
requirement of a causal/mechanical account, that is, some idea of the
processes that lead probabilistically to the explained result (1984, p. 22).

Here, at last, it becomes possible to make the needed distinction between
mechanistic and other forms of statistical explanation, but Salmon did
not make it. Instead, it is James Woodward who pointed out that the
causal/mechanical model is not satisfied in statistical mechanics. For
in that science, Woodward says, ‘one abstracts radically from details
of such individual causal processes and focuses on finding a way of
representing the aggregate behavior of molecules’ (Woodward 1989,
p. 363).

Peter Railton’s is the only model of statistical explanation – or probabilistic
explanation, in his preferred term – that I know of, that explicitly
excludes statistical mechanics and thereby makes the needed distinction
(Railton 1977). He calls the explanations he models ‘deductivenomological-
probabilistic’ (D-N-P) explanations. We can skip over the
reason Railton gives why they are deductive. The thesis germane to our
interest is that D-N-P explanations must be causal (in Railton’s sense of
‘causal’, i.e., they must cite mechanisms) as well as probabilistic: they are
‘unsatisfactory unless we can back them up with an account of the mechanism(
s) at work’ (p. 208). Such a mechanism, not being deterministic,
is a ‘chance mechanism’, and thus the model is restricted to genuinely
indeterministic processes:

It is widely believed that the probabilities associated with standard gambling
devices, classical thermodynamics, actuarial tables, weather forecasting, etc., arise
not from any underlying physical indeterminism, but from an unknown or uncontrolled scatter of initial conditions. If this is right, then D-N-P explanation would
be inapplicable to these phenomena even though they are among the most familiar
objects of probabilistic explanation. I do not, however, find this troublesome:
if something does not happen by chance, it cannot be explained by chance.
(p. 223)

19 It is remarkable that Salmon, like Hempel and many other authors in this field, paid so little attention, at least in this context, to the explanations yielded by statistical mechanics. Salmon cited statistical mechanics several times, but always briefly and with respect to examples in which thermodynamic laws interpreted probabilistically are assumed, not explained (1970, pp. 209ff.; 1984, pp. 26, 180–1; 1998, p. 151). But the chief glory of statistical mechanics is its explanation of those laws: a fact of which these same authors were well aware and that has been much discussed in another context by philosophers of science, where the topic is theoretical ‘reduction’.

It might be objected that explaining something as being due to chance is
no explanation at all; but Railton’s thought is that it is the chance mechanism
that explains its effects, probabilistically, and not chance per se.20

Railton continues, ‘What must be given up is the idea that explanations
can be based on probabilities that have no role in bringing the world’s
explananda about’ (p. 223, emphasis in original).21 But that is an amazing
claim. For, surely, statistical mechanics, even in its early, Newtonian
phase, has provided some of the most impressive and successful explanations
in modern science. They have been called ‘explanations’ and have
been accepted as such and felt to be explanatory. To deny that they are
explanations is, in effect, to impose one’s narrower definition in lieu of
a broader, established use of the term. Far better, I think, to admit that
explanation takes different forms.

Explanations we may call ‘statistical’ fall into two classes. Those of
the one class are the explanations that Hempel, Salmon, Railton, et al.
evidently had in mind when they offered their models of statistical or
probabilistic explanation. They are mechanistic in kind; for they all seek
to explain particular outcomes by citing particular conditions. By our
generous definition of ‘mechanistic’, they are so even if they lack the
specification of mechanisms that Railton and Salmon say is essential to
a complete mechanistic explanation. Let us follow Railton, but without
insisting that mechanisms be specified, in naming this subclass of statistical
explanation ‘probabilistic explanation’.

The other class of statistical explanation is not mechanistic; at least,
that is what I argue in some detail in the next chapter with respect, first, to
statistical mechanics and, next, to natural selection. That of course contradicts
the standard view that both sciences are mechanistic. Neglected
by logicians, this latter form of statistical explanation needs a name. As
the explananda of these explanations are anisotropic processes, that is,
the (practically) irreversible evolution of systems toward final states or
toward new states, let us call them ‘anisotropic explanations’.

20 This is in line with the growing tendency of philosophers to acknowledge a probabilistic
causality (Suppes 1970; Fetzer and Nute 1979), in contrast to the past fashion, of claiming
that quantum mechanics spelled causality’s demise. I believe that Peirce would have
welcomed this development, as witness his later theory of probability as a disposition
(8.225, 2.664–5; cf. Burks 1964), which anticipated Popper’s well-known propensity
theory (Popper 1959) that Railton exploits. Deterministic causality may then be seen as
a special case of probabilistic causality (where p=1).

21 In a later paper, Railton acknowledges that classical, i.e., Newtonian, statistical mechanics is explanatory, but only as it bears on an ideal but unavailable explanation that, in this case, would be deterministic (1981, pp. 249–52).

The division of explanations between those that are deterministic
(‘deductive nomological’, in Hempel’s phrase) and those that are statistical
is far less fundamental, I suggest, than is the distinction between
mechanistic explanations, whether deterministic or probabilistic, on the
one hand, and anisotropic explanations, on the other. The use of statistics
is so different in probabilistic and anisotropic explanations, respectively,
that the two being lumped together as ‘statistical’ is misleading though
not incorrect. In the next chapter, I argue that teleological explanation is
a subclass of anisotropic explanation. Teleological explanation is distinct
from explanation in statistical mechanics, yet the two are far closer in
nature to one another than either is to probabilistic explanation.

The failure to recognize that explanation in statistical mechanics is not
probabilistic (in the sense we are now giving to the latter term), but is of
another form altogether, has kept that form of explanation from being
recognized. And, as teleological explanation is, at bottom, of that form,
it has kept teleological explanation under its historic cloud of suspicion.

What Is The Meaning of Deterministic Mechanics…???

http://heavysideindustries.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Peirce-TheoryofSigns.pdf

"Purposes and Goals Are Universals…"

"The Non-Subjectivity of Subjectivity__Desires Grounded In Goals and Purposes Are Actually Objectively Grounded…"

"Feelings Are Grounded Objectively…"


(pages 95-96)
Historically, as Hull notes, mechanistic explanations were opposed to
teleology. We shall use ‘mechanical’ and its cognates in that historical
sense. Whatever we make ‘mechanical’ to mean and whatever we make
‘final’ to mean, we will keep them opposed. Opposed, that is, not in the
sense that explanations of both types cannot be legitimate, but in the
sense that they can never be the same or reduced one to the other. But
that decision does not determine the precise meaning of ‘mechanical’,
since the conceptions of teleological explanation and of final causation
are yet to be determined. Our question is whether naturalistic explanation
must always be exclusively mechanistic. To frame that question in a
nontrivial way, we need definitions of ‘mechanical’ and of ‘final’ that are
rooted in historical usage but that are also the broadest possible while
still maintaining their mutual opposition.

The science of mechanics is too narrow to provide such a definition.
Not all theories in modern science that have been opposed to teleology
belong to mechanics. Hence, we shall have to form a more general idea
of the mechanistic, of which mechanics will be but one example. But let
us begin by reflecting on mechanics.

The conception of mechanics has undergone a remarkable evolution.
At first, mechanics was the study of the transmission of motion through
bodily contact, as with cogwheels and billiard balls. But gravity, whose law
Newton formulated but did not explain by any mechanism, seemed to
be a kind of ‘action at a distance’, that is, force acting instantaneously
over distance without bodily contact. And with quantum mechanics, in
which there are even stranger relations between distant particles, the
assumption of determinism was replaced by probability. The standard
definition of mechanics, as the science of the effects, either movement
or equilibrium, of forces on bodies, abstracts from these variants (if we
allow that ‘effects’ may be related only probabilistically to their ‘causes’).
But what is a body?

In the development of the wave theory of light and field theories of
electromagnetism (in which, at any rate, there is no action at a distance,
as they allot time to the propagation of energy through space), a continuous
material medium was once supposed. At another time, wave and
field phenomena were interpreted by a hypothetical interaction of discrete
particles. Here we have two ideas of the body involved, one continuous
and singular, the other discontinuous and plural. At a later stage
in the development of these theories, no material medium at all was
supposed; wave and field theories thus became independent of mechanics.
In contemporary physics, with Schr¨odinger’s wave mechanics, matter
itself is seen to have wave characteristics. So, what is matter? The particles
of microphysics do not behave in ways it was once thought proper for
bodies to behave. Thus it is far from clear what philosophers today, who
believe that matter and mechanical action is everything, really do believe.

The generalized idea of mechanics mentioned above is subject to
a further generalization, by dropping its reference to bodies and thus
extending its reach to wave and field theories. The result cannot be called
‘mechanics’, but we will adopt it as a definition of ‘mechanistic’. Mechanics
is then but one mechanistic science among others.

Let us say that an explanation of a particular,E(for effect), is mechanistic
if and only if, by general laws or equations, deterministic or probabilistic,
it relates E to particulars (forces, bodies, events, states, conditions, fields,
or processes) that exist or occur or obtain not later than E. The laws
cited will also be called ‘mechanistic’: mechanistic laws relate particulars
to particulars – that is, they relate particulars of one type to particulars
of other types. And something is mechanical, we shall say, if, and only so
far as, it conforms to mechanistic laws: that is, if, and only so far as, facts
about it are explicable mechanistically. A mechanical cause is a particular
that is not later than its effect, to which it is related by a mechanistic law.

There are of course mechanistic explanations of laws or general phenomena
as well as of particulars, and these are usually the explanations
that are of most interest in science. Roughly, such explanations show
the law or general phenomenon to be explained to be an instance of
other laws, perhaps as applied to conditions of certain kinds. But these
latter laws must also be mechanistic, that is, they relate particulars of
one type to particulars of other types. That is fundamental to our ensuing
argument, namely, that mechanistic explanation is always in terms of
laws that relate particulars (of one type) to particulars (of other types).
In practice, the requirement of law may be greatly relaxed: a rough
idea that this is a regular way that things go on may do, and that idea does
not have to be stated. ‘The window was broken by being hit by a stone’ is a
mechanistic explanation. Also, we said nothing about whether laws must
be universal or may be local, nor how causes are to be identified (e.g., as
complete, partial, necessary, sufficient, independently controlled, salient
practically). Our definitions take for granted that there are concepts
of explanation, law, and cause; but they presuppose no specific such
concepts. Thus we evade complex controversies. We have only stipulated
what, in each of those categories, however they may be construed, we
shall call ‘mechanistic’ or ‘mechanical’.

There are philosophers who insist that a mechanistic explanation must
cite particular mechanisms that ‘bring about’ the effects explained. We
omit such a clause, since many scientists and philosophers have thought
that subsumption under law suffices to explain phenomena nonteleologically.
But the broth may be peppered with such clauses, according
to your taste. Our definitions are deliberately broad, meaning only to
exclude the teleological.

Final causation is excluded by our having made mechanistic explanation
of particulars always to be by particulars. For a final cause is never
a particular. Particulars are identified spatio-temporally.2 Final causes –
whether ends or ideals – have no spatio-temporal identity or particular
existence.

By this definition of ‘mechanistic’, psychological, sociological, and economic
explanations are also mechanistic to the extent that they explain
particular outcomes as following by law, often probabilistic, from particular
conditions. If that seems too much a stretch of the mechanistic idea,
we may call these explanations ‘nomological’, noting that they also are
opposed to teleological explanation.

It has been common among philosophers at least since Hume to suppose
that mechanical causes are particular events that precede and determine
their particular effects, which are also events.We have brought that
idea into closer conformity with physical theory, wherein events are not
always at issue, the processes described are often continuous, many equations
relate co¨existing conditions, and laws may be probabilistic.3

2. Spatio-temporal location may be complex. Two fields of force extend throughout space and in that sense coincide. Yet they are distinguishable spatio-temporally by the fact that they are identified with different magnitudes and directions at the same spatio-temporal points (in the simplest cases, they have distinct centers). The magnitude and direction of a force is of course revealed through actual effects on existing bodies.
3. Many authors instead deny that causality has much to do with modern physics. It comes to the same. My choice is dictated by the convenience of causal language for our purpose.

Notice that I have used the adjective ‘mechanical’ to characterize phenomena,
their causes, and so on, and the adjective ‘mechanistic’ to characterize
theories and explanations. (By calling laws ‘mechanistic’, we take
them as stated; that is not to deny their reality.) For our purposes, it
helps to keep these two levels terminologically distinct. For example, to
call a mechanistic explanation ‘mechanical’ is confusing, as that could
mean that it was produced thoughtlessly. Philosophy presents a third
level. The philosophical idea that all of the world operates mechanically
and that everything can be explained mechanistically is conventionally
named ‘mechanism’, but as that term also applies to particular mechanical
systems, I suggest that we use ‘mechanicalism’ instead.4 One can
accept many mechanistic explanations and theories – one can be a physicist
working exclusively in mechanics – without being a mechanicalist. I
like my neologism ‘mechanicalism’ because it is as awkward as is, in my
opinion, the view it denotes.

Tornados Suck__Except As Possible QM Explications...

. . . you do not get down to anything completely determinate till you specify an indivisible instant of time, which is an ideal limit not attained in thought or in re. Peirce

To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be caused by nothing human, but by some external permanency – by something on which our thinking has no effect. Peirce

Such is the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis . . . is this: There are real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those realities affect our senses according to regular laws. . . . Peirce


Different minds may set out with the most antagonistic views, but the progress of investigation carries them by a force outside of themselves to one and the same conclusion . . . . The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. Peirce

“Still haven't worked through it all as my daily life is taking it's toll. We actually had several tornados hit a few communities last night. One came close to my house and caused a lil leak in the roof. No major damage for me though other than having to be without power for a few more days.” Tim

Hi Tim, finally got through all the wrecked towns and truck stops, and settled in back in Maine. I’ll just make this a short note, as my brain really ain’t quite back on line yet__as I was pretty shocked, seeing all that much damage, since we traveled through about 20 different spots, hard hit. One was a major truck stop, completely destroyed__trucks and trailers scattered on both sides of I-81, plus houses and businesses completely descimated…

“Anyways, I haven't had time to research the specifics, but what I'm thinking is that to further unite RM and QM, we treat a linear absolute distance and time scale as the Bohr model of the atom, whereas each orbital has an energy level allowing the absorption of a photon or emission thereof to discretely alter the electrons orbital relationship. In my scenario, light sets the bar whereby each linear distance represented by a lower velocity ratio thereof has a discrete energy level of seperation.” Tim

Yeah Tim, and this is the same as Ellmanl has described it also. My point I guess is that I really don’t see the differences between QM and RM, as I once did. To me, it’s simply a difference of interpretations and mathematical limits__If everyone used the same and fully true classical mathematical measurement limits, I see the QM/RM incommensurabilities dis-appearing. By this I mean, the interpretations would either have to be founded on background independencies for QM, as they are for RM__then figured from new non-relativistic limits for both QM and RM__and, all parties would have to realize exactly where RM is presently exaggerating measurement realities beyond our classical realities. As an example, just because E=MC^2, doesn’t mean physicists, logicians and mathematicians are at liberty to figure our total finiteness__into the pseudo-zero-rest-mass state, at practically zero volumes and an infinite mass point__as is now assumed by many, about the Big-Bang’s Big-Pseudo-Theory… Somewhere in their figuring, measuring and theorizing, they should realize ‘Real-Time-Classical-Realities’ of possible matter, fields and motions, and ‘Conservation Laws’ prevent such nonsense__but so far, I’ve never been able to get these simple ‘Universal Facts’ across to others... I hope you see what I’m stating__Tis absolutely impossible to have a physically conserved Universe, and a single small volume high mass point__as any known scientific reality__Period…! Ever…! Relativity of motion and time can only be applied within the classical motion and time constraints of logical possibilities__Not within the pseudo-impossibilities__That means all must function within c, or it’s recognized group 2c realities, or it ain’t science__It’s science-fiction…

Now, if we limit science to this c-logical reality, we may be able to figure the Universal necessary mechanics__that truly does govern our entire Universe__less all the science-fiction that’s actually out there, and I don’t mean your points Tim, but I’m just stating my points about all the nonsense being touted, and even produced by real pseudo-physicists for the History Channel, etc. To me, all the nonsense has showed up by exceeding the limits of true c-possibilities__and one may as well state religious views, as these, since once science leaves the confines of ‘Absolute c’ as it’s base measurement ‘FACT’__the fundamental of all measurement systems known to man, he’s left all realms open to sound science… By simply realizing this simple factual truth of ‘Fundamental Absolute c Measurement Necessity’__and then clearly founding the fine structure constant accordingly within all the Planck constants__the CODATA can be properly set to easily unite QM and RM, and be fully consistent with CM__with just simple and small corrections for RM, to QM and CM… This ain’t rocket-science__It’s simple common sense, respecting modal logic possibilities, probabilities and necessities… This also brings the Universal Manifold into Unity as a working Continuum, where the Parts and Wholes are properly functioning under a single Universal Field, extended and entangled, across the entire Manifold… I can thoroughly explain this later, when my mind is clearer__but the scientist/logician Peirce already mentioned it back in the late 1800’s, but the world chose to ignore him__until more recently… Kant also mentioned it some 200 years ago, when a young scientist/physicist__before turning his massive talents to philosophy…

“This would extend the EM spectrum to encompass massive systems in a sense, whereby the rest mass of a system is it's default velocity state and the gain or loss of relative mass which can transition a system along the scale is required to alter the energy level of the system as with absorption emission aspects thus allowing various rest mass systems to occupy an absolute energy level along the absolute scale as long as they satisify the energy level required to be there.” Tim

You may have stated the above correct, idk__but, I think you’d have to maybe re-think this statement, as the default velocity state must be background independent, and only controlled by it’s own mass increases__sorta on-the-fly__if you get my meaning. When placing oneself inside the manifold, or attempting to place oneself outside the manifold__it gets pretty tricky to keep all the possible, probable and necessary matter, masses and motions in true mechanically necessary perspectives__while relaying the best mechanics explanations possible. Peirce accomplished this same trick by assigning signs to all the different entities, but at the same time allowing the signs background independence to trade positions as conditions warrant, just as per Va = Vr <--> Vu… These velocity and mass values must always be able to interchange states within the entire manifold__thus the necessity of background independence, in our explanations of actual masses and motions… This was the original need for Peirce’s triadic logic system of signs, by way of icons, indices and symbols, etc., and these were often changed up as conditions of logical variants required, for him to describe his complex logical and cosmological systems, etc… It’s just an alternate method of keeping tabs on all the differences within samenesses, so to speak__if ya get my meanings…

“If we consider a photon to be a linear extension through time along the scale like a yard stick and a more massive system to be some temporal extension lesser ratio thereof, i.e., shorter larger diameter rod, then we could perhaps account for the reciprocal conserved loss or gain of mass and velocity from system to system as being conserved by way of the extension aspect whereby all systems have a p=1 relationship through an absolute interval of time. The mass variations we find as being presently conserved within various systems ie e=mcc would be the reciprocal of the mass/energy relationship we found expended along the scale. I want to consider this relationship as with linearly extending an electron orbital and considering the various discrete energy level transitions, but haven't had time to do the research. I think you'll get my meaning though.” Tim

Yeah, I’m following you on extending the conservation aspects, but I think this may already be done by others like Ellman and Mathis, etc., but we can add much to these ideas, I would think__now that I’m thinking it over… Yes, there's much to be identified and brought under the conservation tent__as relates to what you and I are stating… It’s just difficult to pull myself out far enough to see it sometimes, especially when writing directly about it… Your suggestion reminds me of Peirce measuring the hydrodynamic affects and effects on his pendulums, by light and atmosphere changes__while doing his global-positioned gravity measurements__and he was looking for accuracies like these, in the 1800’s…

“This would be taking QM aspects and encorporating them into RM aspects whereby establishing them both as fractal methodologies of absolute time and space mechanics.” Tim

You’d have to explain further, here…

“I like the idea of a motion spectrum with discrete energy level intervals as I've referenced similar aspects in the past.” Tim

Don’t forget, you’ve also got to allow for non-discretes, to cross the energy gaps, within the manifold, to achieve total Universal Unity… By this, I’m simply referring to the infinitesimal extensions and entanglements of the smallest possible aspects of field-waves__the hyper-fine structures Bohr left out of his model of the hydrogen atom… Tim, I don’t think you are ever going to get down to an absolute discrete Universe__without addressing the fundamental wave-continuum of full unity__It’s there, no matter how one tries to avoid it__It’s the ‘one-many-many-one’ non-discrete of the discrete many__or gravity fails__and I don’t see that happening, even if it’s just the wind-friction, you’ve gotta account for it… It still has to be blowing real FS-Wave-Matter…

“I just didn't know how to apply the mechanics. I'm considering the transition of a system in relation to it's rest mass vs relative mass along with the discrete force requirements to change it's linear relationship along the energy spectrum. I'll have to think more on this.” Tim

A few tidbits about mathematical complexity:
Results in metalogic consist of such things as formal proofs demonstrating the consistency, completeness, and decidability of particular formal systems.

Major results in metalogic include:

Proof of the uncountability of the set of all subsets of the set of natural numbers (Cantor's theorem 1891)
Löwenheim-Skolem theorem (Leopold Löwenheim 1915 and Thoralf Skolem 1919)
Proof of the consistency of truth-functional propositional logic (Emil Post 1920)
Proof of the semantic completeness of truth-functional propositional logic (Paul Bernays 1918),[4] (Emil Post 1920)[2]
Proof of the syntactic completeness of truth-functional propositional logic (Emil Post 1920)[2]
Proof of the decidability of truth-functional propositional logic (Emil Post 1920)[2]
Proof of the consistency of first order monadic predicate logic (Leopold Löwenheim 1915)
Proof of the semantic completeness of first order monadic predicate logic (Leopold Löwenheim 1915)
Proof of the decidability of first order monadic predicate logic (Leopold Löwenheim 1915)
Proof of the consistency of first order predicate logic (David Hilbert and Wilhelm Ackermann 1928)
Proof of the semantic completeness of first order predicate logic (Gödel's completeness theorem 1930)
Proof of the undecidability of first order predicate logic (Church's theorem 1936)
Gödel's first incompleteness theorem 1931
Gödel's second incompleteness theorem 1931
Tarski's undefinability theorem (Gödel and Tarski in the 1930s)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metalogic

Hi Lloyd,

Still haven't worked through it all as my daily life is taking it's toll. We actually had several tornados hit a few communities last night. One came close to my house and caused a lil leak in the roof. No major damage for me though other than having to be without power for a few more days.

Anyways, I haven't had time to research the specifics, but what I'm thinking is that to further unite RM and QM, we treat a linear absolute distance and time scale as the Bohr model of the atom, whereas each orbital has an energy level allowing the absorption of a photon or emission thereof to discretely alter the electrons orbital relationship. In my scenario, light sets the bar whereby each linear distance represented by a lower velocity ratio thereof has a discrete energy level of seperation. This would extend the EM spectrum to encompass massive systems in a sense, whereby the rest mass of a system is it's default velocity state and the gain or loss of relative mass which can transition a system along the scale is required to alter the energy level of the system as with absorption emission aspects thus allowing various rest mass systems to occupy an absolute energy level along the absolute scale as long as they satisify the energy level required to be there.

If we consider a photon to be a linear extension through time along the scale like a yard stick and a more massive system to be some temporal extension lesser ratio thereof ie shorter larger diameter rod, then we could perhaps account for the reciprocal conserved loss or gain of mass and velocity from system to system as being conserved by way of the extension aspect whereby all systems have a p=1 relationship through an absolute interval of time. The mass variations we find as being presently conserved within various systems ie e=mcc would be the reciprocal of the mass/energy relationship we found expended along the scale. I want to consider this relationship as with linearly extending an electron orbital and considering the various discrete energy level transitions, but haven't had time to do the research. I think you'll get my meaning though.

This would be taking QM aspects and encorporating them into RM aspects whereby establishing them both as fractal methodologies of absolute time and space mechanics. I like the idea of a motion spectrum with discrete energy level intervals as I've referenced similar aspects in the past. I just didn't know how to apply the mechanics. I'm considering the transition of a system in relation to it's rest mass vs relative mass along with the discrete force requirements to change it's linear relationship along the energy spectrum. I'll have to think more on this.

The Task of Science Is To Find The Laws of Facts… Helmholtz

Whoever in the pursuit of science, seeks after immediate practical utility may rest assured that he seeks in vain. --Academic Discourse (Heidelberg 1862)

Well Tim, I had a whole post ready to go, and my computer had one of those famous critical crashes, so I lost it__I just love these new operating systems__the bigger they get, the worse they are... Anyway, as you can see by the title and the notes posted below, I'm working in very similar areas as you... I've been playing with the c-velocity capacities of brain waves to process concepts at one time__and just how much information can be packed into our ideations__as per the frequency, amplitude and wavelenght mechanics involved, especially as relates to the real c-velocities, when constrained within our physiological brain systems, at the much reduced c-velocities. I been looking at this for about 6 months now, as to me, only a certain amount of information is possible of packing into a single concept, even with the help of the best compression algorithms, as even alrogithms have c-limits of compression capacity also. To me, much of what's mentioned in the notes below is related more to physical capacity of c-mental wave-capacity, within Planck lengths and or volumes, etc., than to any real 'Aporias', unknowabilities, incommensurabilities or indiscernibles__but it's up to us to find the newest 'Laws of Facts' that must be applied to this mechanics__to make it plainer to our understandings... All I'm talking about is looking at the facts of what can possibly be processed of all the systems we work with__and to me, this is where Peirce's categories, and Helmholtz's 'Laws of Facts' come into the picture... It's more complex than this, but I'm just putting forward my general ideas, right now, as over the next week, I've got to beat my way up through tornado alley, and back to Maine__Then I'll settle down and explain this all much clearer__but it's generally the same direction you seem to be traveling...

Later...

Absolute infinity is not a number__It’s a dialectic logic statement about an abstract image…

Dialectic logic goes to absolute infinity__Beyond number__‘Aporia…’

Mathematical infinity does not logically reach absolute infinity…

The Empty Set Paradox__Absolute Empty Sets Can’t Exist, Except Abstractly…

The First Number Has No Predecessor__Wrong__Images Precede Numbers…

Complexity is c-dependent unprovable__at certain limits…

Information is c-dependent concept mechanics’ knowable__Too much knowledge in one concept at a time, c-shorts out into ‘Aporia…’

‘Aporia’ is a physiological meta-physical state of imagination…

The Absolutely Physiological Mind, Perception, and Comprehension…

P.s.
Here's part of that original post, that did get saved as draft, I just noticed:

Hi Tim, below are some of the ideas I'm presently working with, that closely relates to your ideas also, as per the title of this post from Helmholtz. My ideas are trying to work out the wording for a c-conceptual system's capacity to process the maximum amount of information__and what may actually be needed for new algorithms, to possibly process more universal and particular information at once__without exceeding what light's motion is actually capable of at our brain constrained concept velocities...

We can only process what the speed of light in brain-matter allows of its mechanics__though this can be much extended with better 'Laws of Facts', better compression algorithms, and much better ordered category systems, imo...

That 'Laws of Facts' from Helmholtz, really rings a bell for me__as I stated earlier, he was Peirce's contemporary scientist, in Germany, and of course known as the true father of the 'Conservation Laws...'

Not much time to explain Lloyd, but I almost forgot about one of the aspects I was considering. Which was the conservation of momentum through space and time. Simply put, absolute distance and time perhaps allows us to study every system as being an extension thereof and throughout, whereby allowing the block universe type absolute observer position of treating every system as a conservation of mass and velocity thus momentum whereby the temporal extension of a massive body vs that of a high velocity less massive system would have absolute distances as adjusted by way of the relativistic factors, whereby we could acknowledge how a propagating electron through it's high velocity orbital motion is equivalent to the nucleus when plotted as an absolute extended system. I feel that we are often looking at the same system expressing itself differently through distance and time. The c conservation aspects we discuss often imply this if we really think about it. We merely need to consider the implications of the ability for this perspective to allow understanding of the equivalency of systems in some form or fashion. I'm working on a good example of what I mean and will post later.

Hi Lloyd, I'm trying out the text feature to post from my phone. Your wheel story reminds me of some of my stories when growing up. My curiosity often out weighed my common sense. Lol

I'm on nights so when I get home in the morning I'm gonna try to work up an animation whereby the absolute distance line is pulled across one side of the gear assembly whereby outputting a conserved work distance across the other gear in ratio. You can see the Relative implication of the greater the mass the less the interaction with space/distance and the more the interaction with time within the gear assembly and vice versa. What I'm looking for is an output mass relationship by using the gear assembly similar to block and tackle or a chainfall, thus having a classic mechanical analogy to RM and QM. Imagine using one set of gears and moving the absolute distance across one side as an input whereby the gear ratio outputs some mass value relationship whereby relating absolute distance and time with relative distance and time and a product relational to a mass value. With the high velocity ratio, you can imagine the distance having to be pulled across the small gear to generate a minimal mass value output across the large gear. This would relate relative time directly to mass but I'll have to consider such further.

Later,

Tim